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CONFLICT OF LAWS IN AIR CRASH CASES:




0 N MARCH 3, 1974, a Douglas DC-10 passenger air-
plane owned and operated by Turkish Air Lines
crashed in France, killing all 333 passengers and thirteen
crew members.' The United States District Court for the
Central District of California had to deal with 203 suits
arising from the crash, including ten suits transferred to it
from other district courts.2 The total number of depen-
dents claiming damages was estimated at about one thou-
sand.3 The defendants were the manufacturers of the
aircraft, the airline and the United States government.'
The victims accused the United States of wrongfully certi-
fying and negligently inspecting the plane.5 The victims
of the crash were from Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, England, France, India,
Northern Ireland, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mo-
rocco, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, Senegal,
South Vietnam, Switzerland, Turkey, United States and
West Germany.6 Claimants came from all of these coun-
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tries plus Israel and Sweden.7 The American claimants
were from the states of California, Indiana, Kansas, Mary-
land, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Washington.8
All these suits were consolidated and resulted in a sin-
gle judgment.9 The court admitted that neither it nor its
staff had found the time to tabulate the number of coun-
tries or states actually involved.' 0 The lawyers represent-
ing the parties differed as to which law should govern the
issue of damages.' Their suggestions included the law of
California, the law of France, the law of California with
French "moral" damages, the law ofJapan, the law of the
domicile of each particular decedent and the law of the
domicile of each particular claimant.' 2 The court charac-
terized the "judicial nightmare known as Conflicts of
Laws"'13 as "a veritable jungle, which, if the law can be
found out, leads not to a 'rule of action' but a reign of
chaos."' 4 One commentator called the whole litigation an
"international legal dogs' dinner."
A complicated situation such as the one described
above may be one conflicts lawyer's nightmare, or per-
haps another's dream case. These complex conflicts is-
sues, however, are not at all unusual in lawsuits arising
from air accidents. Since air travel is especially suited for
long-distance transportation, the point of departure and
the scheduled destination lie often in different jurisdic-
tions. Between these two places, the aircraft often passes
through the air space of a varying number of additional
jurisdictions. A crash may occur in a country having no
relationship whatsoever to either the carrier or the pas-
sengers. Moreover, the aircraft, or a crucial component,






'- Id. at 740.
14 Id. at 739.
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may well have been manufactured in still another country,
with repair or servicing done elsewhere. The passengers
may be citizens, residents or domicilliaries of countries
around the globe; they may have purchased their tickets
(i.e. entered into contracts of carriage) in other jurisdic-
tions; and they may leave survivors having ties to still
other nations or states. The place of incorporation and
the principal place of business of the carrier or manufac-
turer, as well as the place of the aircraft's registration, in-
crease this embarrassing heap of connecting factors.
Other conceivably relevant points of contact could be ad-
ded to the list.
In international carriage by air, a carrier's liability is
usually limited by the Warsaw Convention. 15  Since the
carrier is normally willing to pay these limited damages,
there is seldom any reason to bring a lawsuit. Therefore,
a plaintiff seeking compensation in excess of the Warsaw
limits must focus his efforts on someone else. Potential
targets include everybody in any way involved in the de-
sign, manufacture, sale, installation, maintenance, or in-
spection of the aircraft or of a critical malfunctioning
component which may have caused or at least contributed
to the accident. Those who trained the aircraft's crew,
supplied the navigational charts and weather forecasts
used by the pilot, or supervised the air-control tower's ac-
tivities are all potential defendants. The government is
also a potential defendant for its negligence in permitting
the use of unreliable aircraft or in supervising the airlines
and airports.
The existing case law in this field consists almost exclu-
sively of decisions rendered by various courts in the
United States. Almost no European decisions deal with
the private international law aspects of an air crash. The
concentration of litigation in American courts is no
coincidence.
1-1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876, 137 L.T.N.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
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The United States has the most developed air transpor-
tation system, due both to that country's size and techno-
logical development. American air carriers perform an
important part of air carriage in the world today, includ-
ing flights totally outside the United States. Americans
travel very often, and there is at least one American pas-
senger on most scheduled international flights. More-
over, American companies design and manufacture many
of the world's commercial aircraft. Since the United
States consists of more than fifty different jurisdictions,
even American domestic air transportation may give rise to
complicated issues of conflict of laws. Domestic carriage
is not subject to the Warsaw Convention and the substan-
tive rules governing the carrier's liability differ among the
various states, as do the rules on the product liability of
aircraft manufacturers. Naturally, these factors increase
the number of American air crash cases where the rules
on jurisdiction and on conflict of laws are of crucial
importance.
Liberal American jurisdiction rules are a significant
contributing cause of the concentration of air crash litiga-
tion in the United States. Most foreign plaintiffs prefer to
sue in theUnited States even when they could easily util-
ize the courts in their own countries or elsewhere. This
preference is mainly due to the extremely high - some
would even say astronomical - damages that American
courts commonly award plaintiffs. A foreign lawyer, con-
fronted with the figures of American damage awards, is
reduced to a state of incredulity. Many plaintiffs are par-
ticularly tempted by the prospect of steep punitive dam-
ages allowed under the laws of many American states.
American law, in addition, often allows generous compen-
sation to the victim or his survivors for not readily quanti-
fiable injuries such as pain and suffering or the loss of love
and companionship. The American courts' extensive use
of the concept of strict liability in tort (liability without
negligence) also encourages the choice of an American
forum.
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While adjudication in an American court does not auto-
matically mean application of American substantive law,
the strong homeward tread of many American judges sub-
stantially increases the plaintiff's chances of the court ap-
plying American law. Besides, a court accustomed to high
monetary awards can be expected to be generous when
applying foreign law and it may even find foreign limita-
tions of liability or damages to be contrary to the public
policy of the forum. All this may, however, change within
the foreseeable future. Since high awards have made lia-
bility insurance too expensive or even totally unavailable
in some fields, a number of state legislatures in the United
States have adopted various tort reform statutes restrict-
ing liability and the size of awards. Within eighteen
months between the years 1986 and 1987, forty-two states
have enacted tort reform legislation of this type.' 6 States
still differ on tort reform legislation; however, the states
are remarkedly similar in their approach to such legisla-
tion. One commentator notes that tort reform legislation
is "the most extraordinary state law development having
national impact" since the states adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code. 17
The structure of legal fees in the United States also en-
courages foreign plaintiffs to sue in American courts.
American attorneys in tort cases operate on the basis of a
contingent fee (i.e. instead of fixed fees, they receive a
certain percentage, typically around thirty percent, of the
damages they recover for their clients). In many other
countries, including most of Western Europe, this system
- Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521,
1523 (1987). See generally NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SE-
LECTED STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTION RE: AFFORDABILITY AND AVAILABILITY OF LIA-
BILITY INSURANCE (Aug. 4, 1986). The Justice Department attributes the
insurance crisis to modern tort law's expansion of corporate liability exposure.
Priest, supra, at 1523. Forty-two states have enacted tort reform or insurance leg-
islation on the basis of the Department's attribution of the crises to tort law. Id.
17 Priest, supra note 16, at 1523-24. Mr. Priest writes, "[T]he general similarity
in approach and the sudden spontaneity of the response represent the most ex-
traordinary state law development having national impact since the states' unani-
mous adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code." Id.
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is illegal or at least considered contrary to the bar associa-
tion's professional code of ethics. The partisans of the
contingent fee system maintain that it gives even a poor
person the chance to have a top lawyer in a country where
legal aid is extremely limited.
While a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
of the contingent fee system is beyond the scope of this
paper, the presence of this system in the United States is
of great importance in air crash cases because the defend-
ant's liability may be remote and the risk of costly and un-
certain litigation would undoubtedly otherwise deter
many plaintiffs. Many American lawyers, furthermore, ac-
tively promote litigation by offering their services to pro-
spective clients. In cases of air crashes with large
numbers of victims and extensive publicity, it is common
that the victims or their survivors, including those outside
the United States, are quickly contacted by American law-
yers eager to represent them. This contributes, of course,
to the concentration of litigation in American courts.
Since American procedural law normally does not re-
quire the losing party to pay the winning party's costs, a
plaintiff can sue without the risk of significant financial ex-
posure. The defendant, on the other hand, faces the
prospect of non-reimbursable litigation costs and may be
willing to settle the plaintiff's claim by offering some com-
pensation even if he is convinced that the claim is totally
unfounded. Many foreign plaintiffs, who might not dare
to initiate a lawsuit in their own countries, thus can sue in
the United States with no actual risk and with good pros-
pects of at least some recovery.
Plaintiffs reap still another benefit from tort litigation
under American procedural law. Trial by jury, rarely
available in other countries, is a constitutionally protected
right in the United States.' It is generally believed that a
jury will arrive at a more generous verdict for an injured
I' U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
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victim or a deceased victim's survivors seeking damages
from a large, faceless corporation than will a court sitting
without a jury.
Finally, the extensive American rules on pre-trial dis-
covery of evidence are very advantageous for the plaintiff
who can demand that the defendants, or even third per-
sons, disclose all kinds of information and produce docu-
ments, including documents situated in other countries.
This type of "fishing expedition" sometimes leads to the
discovery of valuable admissible evidence favorable to the
plaintiff which otherwise might have remained hidden.
The wealth of American case law consisting of hun-
dreds of reported decisions, coupled with the extreme
scarcity of related decisions from other countries, gives
American material a dominant role in any comparative
study in this field. When studying the American materials
one must, nevertheless, keep in mind that they are not
representative of the private international law of most
other countries. Most countries, after all, have relevant
jurisdictional and conflict rules, although the opportunity
to apply them to an air crash case may never have arisen.
II. JURISDICTION
A. The Warsaw Convention
Almost all international carriage by air is governed by
the provisions of the Warsaw Convention (the Conven-
tion). 19 The Convention was amended by The Hague
Protocol in 1955.20 The United States, however, has rati-
fied only the original wording of the Convention. 2' To-
day, few countries remain totally outside the Warsaw
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
Id.
11 Warsaw Convention, supra note 15.
20 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air, opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478
U.N.T.S. 371, ICAO Doc. 7686 - LC/140, reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION
LAW 955 (2d ed. Doc. Supp. 1981) [hereinafter Hague Protocol].
21 See L. KREINDLER, 1 AvIATION ACCIDENT LAw § 12.02 (1987).
1988] 309
310 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [54
system.22
The Convention provides for certain uniform substan-
tive and procedural rules regarding the liability of the car-
rier vis-a-vis the passengers or their survivors. The
Convention does not regulate the liability of the aircraft
manufacturer, the manufacturer of fuel, the airport opera-
tor, etc. As to the jurisdiction of courts, article 28(1) of
the original text provides that:
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of
the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties, either before the Court of the domicile of
the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where
he has a place of business through which the contract has
been made or before the Court at the place of
destination.23
The Hague Protocol did not change the wording of arti-
cle 28.24 The Guatemala Protocol of 197 1,25 which is not
yet effective, inserted a new paragraph 2 providing that:
In respect of damage resulting from the death, injury or
delay of a passenger or the destruction, loss, damage or
delay of baggage, the action may be brought before one of
the Courts mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article, or in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
before the Court within the jurisdiction of which the car-
rier has an establishment if the passenger has his domicile
or permanent residence in the territory of the same High
Contracting Party.26
This amendment was proposed in order to make the
Protocol more attractive to the United States. It enables
almost all American passengers or their survivors to sue
2 Silets, Something Special in the Air and on the Ground. The, Potential for Unlimited
Liability of International Air Carriers for Terrorist Attacks under the Warsaw Convention and
Its Revisions, 53J. AIR L. & CoM. 321, 329 n.27 (1987).
2 Warsaw Convention, supra note 15, at art. 28(1).
24 Hague Protocol, supra note 20, at art. 28(1).
2-1 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air, done Mar. 8, 1971, ICAO Doc. 8932
(1971), reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 975, 978 [hereinafter Guate-
mala Protocol].
26 Id. at art. XII.
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the carrier in the United States since most international
air carriers have some kind of an establishment there.
This is not a question of mere convenience considering
that American proceedings are usually extremely
favorable to the plaintiff. It is hardly surprising that some
authors find the new article 28(2) to be excessively gener-
ous to Americans.2 7
None of the versions of the Convention grant jurisdic-
tion to the courts of the country where the air crash oc-
curred. The Convention seeks to avoid judicial
proceedings in the overflown countries because they may
be underdeveloped nations with inadequate judicial
resources.
The jurisdiction of courts is strictly defined by article 28
and must neither be extended nor restricted by the parties
to the Convention. 8 This means that the courts of a
country having jurisdiction under the Convention must
not refuse to adjudicate a case on the ground that there is
a forum that is more convenient elsewhere. Article 32 in-
validates attempts by the parties to alter by agreement the
Convention's jurisdiction rules prior to an accident. 9 In
addition, the parties are not permitted, in the case of car-
riage of passengers, to replace these rules with an arbitra-
tion agreement.3
Thus, where the Convention is applicable, it is usually
27 See, e.g., Matte, International Air Transport, 12 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMP. L.
6-1, 6-168-69 (1982).
28 Warsaw Convention, supra note 15, at art. 28(1). Article 28 provides that the
plaintiff "must" bring an action for damages in one of the enumerated jurisdic-
tions. Id.
21, Id. at art. 32. Article 32 provides:
Any clause contained in the contract and all special agreements en-
tered into before the damage occurred by which the parties purport
to infringe the rules laid down by this convention, whether by decid-
ing law to be applied, or by altering the rules as to jurisdiction, shall
be null and void.
Id.
I3 Id. Article 32 further provides: "Nevertheless for the transportation of goods
arbitration clauses shall be allowed, subject to this convention, if the arbitration is
to take place within one of the jurisdictions referred to in the first paragraph of
Article 28." Id.
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clear whether the forum has jurisdiction. There may be,
however, different views as to the proper venue within the
forum country. The prevailing, albeit not unanimous,
opinion is that venue is a problem beyond the purview of
article 28 because this article deals only with the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of a contracting state as a whole. Article
28 leaves it to the law of that country to decide which par-
ticular court can or must adjudicate the dispute.
There are, however, several areas of controversy re-
garding the interpretation of article 28(1). One such area
concerns the meaning of the provision allowing an action
to be brought against a carrier "where he has a place of
business through which the contract has been
made . ., . Many tickets are sold by airlines through
independent travel agencies or through other airlines on
the basis of an interline arrangement. The French courts
have held that the office of an independent travel agent or
of another airline issuing the ticket is not a place of busi-
ness of the air carrier. 2 On the other hand, the West
German Bundesgerichtshof held that the entry into an air
cargo contract by a regular I.A.T.A. agent in Hamburg
acting on behalf of the defendant Saudi-Arabian airline
was sufficient to give jurisdiction to German courts in ac-
cordance with article 28. The American courts seem to
use a similar approach. 4 The liberal interpretation of the
concept of a carrier's place of business by American and
German courts is reasonable with regard to the purpose
of article 28(1). The same liberal interpretation of the
Guatemala Protocol, however, would be inappropriate
since it would allow passengers domiciled or permanently
- Id. at art. 28(1); see supra note 23 and accompanying text for the complete
text of article 28(1).
52 Judgment of March 25, 1986, Cour d'appel, Paris, Fr., reprinted in 157 REVUE
FRANCAISE DE DROIT AiRIEN 544 (1986).
--3Judgment of June 16, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, Senate, W. Ger., 84
Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 339, reprinted in 1982 RIW - RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr 910.
14 See, e.g., Berner v. United Airlines, Inc., 3 A.D.2d 9, 157 N.Y.S.2d 884 (App.
Div. 1956), aft'd, 3 N.Y.2d 1003, 170 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1957) (New York court has
jurisdiction over Australian corporation under the Warsaw Convention).
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residing in large and important countries such as the
United States to always sue in their own country because
practically all air carriers have some kind of representa-
tion there.
Another disputed point is the interpretation of the ex-
pression "place of destination" ,3 especially in cases in-
volving round-trip tickets. The prevailing view is that the
"place of destination" is the starting point of the trip for
round-trip tickets or the place of final destination for
flight other than round-trip. 6 An intermediate stop such
as the point of turnaround does not constitute the "place
of destination" within the meaning of article 28. This view
is confirmed not only by European case law,3 7 but more
importantly by American case law in spite of the well-
known tendency of American courts to extend their juris-
diction.3 8 Thus, the Court of Appeals of New York af-
firmed the judgment of the Appellate Division in Rinck v.
Deutsche Lufthansa A.G., holding that where Nuremberg
was listed as both the place of origin and destination, New
York could not be the place of destination within the
meaning of article 28.3 The fact that the passenger's re-
turn flight was left open did not persuade the court.4"
One dissenting judge objected to the holding because a
- Warsaw Convention, supra note 15, at art. 28(1); see supra note 23 and accom-
panying text for the complete text of article 28(i).
M; See, e.g., Rinck v. Deutsche Lufthansa A.G., 57 A.D.2d 370, 371-72, 395
N.Y.S.2d 7, 8-9 (App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 44 N.Y.2d 714, 405 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1978)
(passenger injured on a roundtrip flight not allowed to bring suit in jurisdiction of
intermediate stop).
7 Judgment of March 23, 1976, Bundesgerichtshof, Senate, W. Ger., reprinted in
29 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1586 (1976); Judgment of June 28, 1973,
Landgericht Berlin, W. Ger., reprinted in 22 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR LUFrRECHT UND WEL-
TRAUMECHTSFRAGEN 304 (1973); Judgment of April 28, 1978, Tribunaux de
grande instance, Fr., reprinted in 129 Revue Francaise de Droit A6rien 80 (1979).
- See Rinck, 57 A.D.2d at 370, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 7. But see Hurley v. KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines, 562 F. Supp. 260, 261 (C.D. Cal.), vacated, 602 F. Supp. 1249 (C.D.
Cal. 1985) ("place of destination" of a round-trip ticket could be either the place
of final destination or intermediate stops along flight route); Aanestad v. Air Can-
ada, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1165, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1975), dismissed, 549 F. Supp. 806
(C.D. Cal. 1977) ("place of destination" means either the intermediate stop or the
final destination of a round-trip flight).
- Rinck, 57 A.D.2d at 372, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
40 Id. at 371-72, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 8-9.
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passenger would not have had to take the flight at all if the
objective was only to depart and arrive at the same
location.41
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit dismissed the cases of Gayda v. LOT Polish
Airlines42 and Petrire v. Spantax, S.A.,43 for lack of jurisdic-
tion. In both cases the survivors of passengers killed in
air crashes sued the carrier in the United States, asserting
that American courts had jurisdiction because the passen-
gers purchased tickets for a round-trip in a foreign coun-
try with an intermediate stop in the United States. 4 The
Petrire case is of particular interest, since the decedent,
who arranged for round-trip air travel between Madrid
and New York, received two separate (albeit consecutively
numbered) ticket booklets, apparently because of the lim-
ited supply on the particular day of booklets with more
than two ticket coupons.45 The court, considering the
time and place of issuance of the booklets and the con-
templated degree of continuity of the journey, held that
there was a single contract of carriage according to which
the place of destination was Madrid.46
B. Western Europe
The EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforce-
ment of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (as
amended),4 7 concluded in Brussels on September 27,
1968 (the "Brussels Convention"), is of importance for
non-Warsaw disputes arising in the EEC countries. The
Brussels Convention is limited, however, to cases where
41 Id. at 372-73, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 9-10. (Silverman, J., dissenting). Justice
Silverman stated, "In modern air travel ... the purchase of a round-trip ticket is
merely a matter of convenience .... [Tlhe fact that one intends to return home
does not mean that that is where one is going when one sets out on a voyage." Id.
at 10.
12 702 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1983).
- 756 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846 (1985).
4 Petrire, 756 F.2d at 265; Gayda, 702 F.2d at 425.
it, Petrire, 756 F.2d at 265.
41 Id. at 266-67.
47 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 97) 2 (1983) [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
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the defendant is domiciled in one of the contracting states
(for legal persons, the seat is treated as domicile). 48 Fur-
thermore, the Brussels Convention is subordinate to
other conventions to which the contracting states are or
will be parties and which govern jurisdiction in relation to
particular matters. 49 As a consequence, the jurisdiction
rules of the Warsaw Convention are to be applied
notwithstanding the Brussels Convention.
Article 2 of the Brussels Convention provides that per-
sons domiciled in a contracting state, regardless of their
nationality, can be sued in the courts of that state.50 Ac-
cording to article 5, a defendant domiciled in a con-
tracting state may, instead, be sued in another contracting
state, inter alia
- in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the
place of performance [forum solutionis];5 1
- in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the
courts for the place where the harmful event occurred [fo-
rum delicti];12
- as regards a civil claim for damages which is based on
an act giving rise to criminal proceedings, in the court
seized of those proceedings; 53
- as regards a dispute arising out of the operations of a
branch, agency or other establishment, in the courts for
the place in which the branch, agency or other establish-
- Id. at art. 2. The Brussels Convention provides: "persons domiciled in a con-
tracting state shall ... be sued in the courts of that state." Id.
- Id. at art. 57. Article 57 of the Brussels Convention provides: "This Conven-
tion shall not affect any Conventions to which the Contracting States are or will be
parties and which, in relation to particular matters, govern jursidiction or the rec-
ognition or enforcement ofjudgments." Id.
• Id. at art. 2. Article 2 of the Brussels Convention provides: ','Subject to the
provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting State shall,
whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State." Id.
51 Id. at art. 5(1).
'- Id. at art. 5(3). The Court ofJustice of the European Communities, which is
entrusted with the interpretation of the Brussels Convention, has held that both
the country of the tortious conduct and the country of the resulting injury or dam-
age have jurisdiction in accordance with this provision. See Handelskwerkerij GJ.
Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A., Recueil 1735, [1976 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8378 (1976).
r, Brussels Convention, supra note 47, at art. 5(4).
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ment is situated.54
According to article 6(1), a person domiciled in a con-
tracting state may also be sued in the courts of the domi-
cile of a co-defendant. 55 This is of great importance in air
crash cases where a plaintiff commonly joins the carrier,
the aircraft manufacturer and a number of other
defendants.
When the forum or the domicile of the defendants does
not lie in a contracting state, the Brussels Convention
rules governing jurisdiction do not apply. One must
therefore consider the many rules relating to jurisdiction
that vary from country to country. While the domicile or
permanent residence of the defendant almost always pro-
vides a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, a number of other
grounds are available as well. Only a few examples will be
mentioned here.
A non-resident can normally be brought to court in
England inter alia if the action is founded on a tort or
breach of contract committed within England or Wales.
In fact, there is jurisdiction even when the dispute is to-
tally unrelated to England, provided that the defendant is
served with the writ in England or Wales. This is true
even if the defendant's visit entails only a couple of min-
utes in transit at an English airport.5 6 However, the the-
ory of forum non conveniens has now become accepted in
England, although not to the extent it is applied in the
United States.57
Forum delicti is also recognized in France,58 Germany59
54 Id. at art. 5(5).
5 Id. at art. 6(1). Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention provides: "A person
domiciled in a Contracting State may also be sued ... where he is one of a number
of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled." Id.
56 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, 1 AIR LAW I(79)-(81) (4th ed. 1987).
57 See, e.g., The Abidin Daver, 1 All E.R. 470; 2 W.L.R. 196 (H.L. 1984) (English
proceeding stayed because Turkey was the country with the closest connection to
the matter litigated).
,, See Y. LoUSSOUARN & P. BOUREL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIvE 567-68 (2d ed.
1980); Code de proc6dure civile [c. pr. vi.] art. 46 (Fr.); see also F. GRIVANT DE
KERSTRAT & W. CRAWFORD, NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 10, art. 46
(1978). Article 46 states: "The claimant has the choice to empower, in addition to
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and Sweden. 60 The French citizenship of the plaintiff or of
the defendant is alone sufficient for French jurisdiction in
accordance with articles 14 and 15 of the French Civil
Code.6' In Germany, as well as in Sweden, a non-domicil-
iary owning assets within the jurisdiction can be sued for
payment of money debts, including debts totally unre-
lated to the forum country and the assets in question (fo-
rum patrimonii).6 2 Dismissal of a case on the ground of
forum non conveniens is impossible, or rarely possible, in the
countries of continental Europe. This, however, has
played little role in air crash cases, since most of these
cases are litigated in American courts.
C. United States
Each state within the United States has in principle its
own rules pertaining to jurisdiction. The federal trial
courts apply the jurisdictional rules of the state in which
they sit, provided the case is adjudicated in a federal court
because the parties are citizens of different states. Such
diversity cases constitute the vast majority of air crash dis-
putes in American federal courts.63 The jurisdictional
rules of the different states, while not identical, are very
similar. It is not uncommon, however, that they fail to
provide clear guidelines. Thus it is extremely difficult for
the parties and their lawyers to predict whether a court
the court of the place where the defendant lives.., in delictual matters, the court
of the place where the delictual act was committed, or of the place where the
damage was suffered ...." Id.
- See Zivilprozess Ordnung [ZPO] art. 32 (W. Ger.).
- See SWEDISH PROC. CODE ch. 10, § 8 (Swed.); see also R. GINSBURG & A. BRUZE-
LIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN 165 (1965) (interpreting Chapter 10, section 8
of the Swedish Procedural Code). "[T]he plaintiff has the option to commence
suit against the tortfeasor ... in the court of the place in which the tortious act
occurred or had its impact." Id.
See C. Civ. arts. 14-15 (Fr.).
,. Cf ZIVILPROZESS BORDNUNG [ZPO] art. 23 (W. Ger.); SWEDISH PROC. CODE
ch. 10, § 3 (Swed.). "[A]ny action against a non-resident defendant involving per-
sonal property situated in Sweden may be brought in the court for the place in
which the property is located." R. GINSBURG & A. BURZELIUS, supra note 60, at
160 (interpreting Chapter 10).
- See Kennelly, Litigation of Foreign Aircraft Accidents - Advantages (Pro and Con)
From Suits in Foreign Countries, 16 FORUM 488, 521 (1981).
1988] 317
318 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [54
has jurisdiction. Predicting what courts will rule in re-
spect to jurisdictional issues can be compared to "trying
to tattoo soap bubbles." 64 Some authors speak in favor of
creating "a set of concrete, objective standards, . . . how-
ever arbitrary they might seem in individual cases, that
would enable litigants to determine whether jurisdiction
was present without taking the question to a reviewing
court." 6
5
A basic jurisdictional principle is that the courts of a
state have jurisdiction if the defendant is a domicilliary.66
When the defendant is a corporation, which is practically
always the case in air crash disputes, the domicilliary of a
corporation is where it is registered.67 However, no state
within the United States limits its jurisdiction to such do-
mestic corporations and in all states there are ample
grounds for jurisdiction over non-consenting foreign cor-
porations as well. For example, a foreign corporation
which is carrying on substantial business activities on a
regular and continuous basis in the forum state may be
held to be "present" in that state. The corporation can be
sued for claims that neither arose in connection with the
local activity of the corporation, nor have any other rela-
-tionship to the forum state.68
If a "non-present" foreign corporation has had some
contact with the forum state and the disputed claim arose
out of this contact, the forum state will often have jurisdic-
tion under the terms of its "long-arm statute", even if the
contact is neither systematic nor continuous but merely a
single transaction. 69 Long-arm statutes vary to some ex-
- Id. at 492.
- Id. (quoting Wisconsin Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Pennant Prod., Inc., 619 F.2d 676,
679 (7th Cir. 1980)).
.... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 29 (1971).
67 See R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL, & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAWS 29-31
(1986); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 323-25 (1982); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAws § 41 (1971).
" See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984);
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). See generally RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 47(2) comment b (1971).
w, See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 165 (1986).
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tent from state to state; however, they usually authorize
jurisdiction over claims arising from "transaction of busi-
ness" or "commission of a tortious act" within the bound-
aries of the forum state. 70 The American courts are
inclined to interpret these jurisdictional grounds very ex-
tensively. It is conceivable, for example, that a court may
base jurisdiction over a foreign airline on a business trans-
action within the forum state even if that transaction con-
sisted of a purchase by the passenger of his ticket there
through a local travel agent or through a local office of
another airline acting under an interline arrangement.7 '
An example of a broad interpretation of another com-
mon ground of jurisdiction under a long-arm statute oc-
curs when a tort is committed within the jurisdiction of
the forum. In Roberts v. Piper Aircraft Corporation,72 the
plaintiff brought a wrongful death action arising out of a
plane crash in New Mexico and directed against two alleg-
edly negligent repair shops and the supplier of allegedly
defective fuel.73 The fuel supplier resided in Nevada and
the repair shops were in Oklahoma and Kansas. 4 While
the defendants committed the allegedly wrongful acts in
Nevada, Oklahoma and Kansas respectively, the court
held that negligent acts caused injury within New Mexico
and were considered a "tortious act" committed in New
Mexico within the meaning of the state's long-arm
statute.75
There is, however, a limit imposed on the long-arm ju-
risdiction by the requirement of "due process of law" in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution
of the United States. 76 In International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton,7 7 the United States Supreme Court held that due pro-
7o Id.
7 See, e.g., Mohler v. Dorado Wings, Inc., 675 S.W.2d 404 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
7' 100 N.M. 363, 670 P.2d 974 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
7:, Id. 670 P.2d at 976.
7 Id.
7, Id. 670 P.2d at 977.
7,i U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
77 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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cess requires that the defendant should have certain
minimum contacts with the forum such "that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.' "78 A criterion of this
type is naturally difficult to translate into specific and
clear-cut rules. As a result, the long-arm statutes of some
states do not require any specific contacts between the de-
fendant (or his activities) and the forum state, but simply
declare that the courts may exercise jurisdiction on any
basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United
States or of the state in question. 79 Generally, American
jurisdictional rules, even allowing for the due process lim-
itations, are on their face much more liberal than the ju-
risdictional rules in most other comparable countries.
Such liberal, often exorbitantly liberal, jurisdictional
rules need some corrective counter-balancing, which is
achieved in the United States by means of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.8° According to this doctrine the court
may, at its discretion, refuse to exercise its jurisdiction if
the forum is seriously inconvenient and a more appropri-
ate forum is available elsewhere.8 The precedent usually
relied on is GulfOil Corp. v. Gilbert, decided in 1947 by the
United States Supreme Court.82 In this case, which did
not concern aviation, the Court defined the factors to be
considered:
An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most
pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. Important
considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of
proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be
7S Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 511 U.S. 457, 468 (1940)).
79 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 17.041 -. 045 (Vernon 1986). In Helicopteros the Court recognized
that the "limits of the Texas [long-arm statute] are coextensive with the Due Pro-
cess Clause." Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 413 n.7.
- See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (non-aviation case applying
the doctrine of forum non conveniens).
s, Id. at 507-08.
'- Id. at 501.
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appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.
There may also be questions as to the enforcibility [sic] of
a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh rela-
tive advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said
that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient fo-
rum, "vex," "harass," or "oppress" the defendant by in-
flicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his
own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of
forum should rarely be disturbed.
Factors of public interest also have place in applying, the
doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts
when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of
being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that
ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community
which has no relation to the litigation .... There is an ap-
propriateness, too, in having the trial ... in a forum that is
at home with the state law that must govern the case,
rather than having a court in some other forum untangle
problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.83
Courts have subsequently followed this line of reasoning
in a large number of air crash cases.84
One of the most important cases in the area is undoubt-
". Id. at 508-09.
84 See, e.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 717 F.2d
602 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (court denied dismissal on forum non conveniens ground due to
ease in accessing sources of proof and United States interest in retaining jurisdic-
tion because of its involvement in the project); Pain v. United Technologies
Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981) (court
granted motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds because the United
States was not a convenient forum for a helicopter owner and necessary docu-
ments were in Norway); Diaz v. Mexicana de Avion, S.A., 20 Av. CAS. (CCH)
17,981 (W.D. Tex. 1987) (court granted motion forforum non conveniens to move
case to Mexico because the crash occurred there, the original plaintiffs lived there,
and the airline was incorporated there); In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport, Saudia
Arabia, on Aug. 19, 1980, 540 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1982) (court granted motion
to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds due to ease in accessing proof in the
foreign forum, prohibitive cost of obtaining willing witnesses, and public interest
factors). But cf In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay, India on Jan. 1, 1978, 531
F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (court refused to dismiss onforum non conveniens
grounds because lack of alternative forum outweighed reasons for bringing suit in
India).
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edly Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno. 85 A small commercial air-
craft, registered in Great Britain and owned and operated
by British companies, crashed in Scotland during a local
charter flight, killing the pilot and all five passengers.8 6
All decedents, their heirs and next of kin were British na-
tionals and residents of Scotland. 8 7 Nevertheless, the rep-
resentatives of the estates of the five passengers instituted
wrongful-death litigation in the United States against the
company that had manufactured the plane in Penn-
sylvania and the company that had manufactured the
plane's propellers in Ohio.88 The plaintiff admitted that
she filed the action in the United States because American
laws regarding liability, capacity to sue and damages were
more favorable to the plaintiff than the corresponding
laws of Scotland.89
The United States District Court granted the defend-
ants' motion to dismiss the action on the ground of forum
non conveniens, finding that Scotland was the appropriate
forum.90 The Third Circuit reversed, however, holding
that dismissal is automatically barred where the law of the
alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiff than the
law of the forum of his choice.9 ' The Supreme Court, re-
jecting this contention, observed that a refusal to dismiss
merely because dismissal might be unfavorable to the
plaintiff would make the crowded American courts, al-
ready attractive to foreign plaintiffs, even more attractive
and congested.92 The Court went on to uphold the view
of the district court that the usual strong presumption in
favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum applies with less
force when the plaintiffs or the real parties in interest are
foreign (i.e. neither residents nor citizens of the forum).93
- 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
- Id. at 238-39.
,7 Id. at 239.
88 Id.
' d. at 240.
Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727, 738 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 163-64 (3d Cir. 1980).
112 PiperAircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 251-52.
w, Id. at 255.
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Furthermore, the Court stated that theforum non conveniens
determination is committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court and that an appellate court may reverse only if
there is a clear abuse of discretion.94 The Court did not
consider the district court's review of the private and pub-
lic factors to be unreasonable.9 5
The United States District Court in Boskoffv. Transportes
Aereos Portugueses96 refused to accept the Portuguese plain-
tiffs' argument that they could not afford to sue at home
because of the compulsory prepayment of trial costs and
the lack of contingent fee arrangements in Portugal.97
The actions of the defendant may also influence the out-
come of the court'sforum non conveniens analysis. Promises
to submit to the jurisdiction of the alternative forum, to
waive possible time limitation objections there, to make
all evidence available to the alternative forum, to finance
the translation of all documentary evidence into the lan-
guage of that forum and even to cover the extra expense
incurred by the plaintiff, may well encourage the court to
dismiss the case.98 The courts sometime condition dis-
missal on these promises being kept.
Tactics may play a great role in forum non conveniens
cases. Sometimes, for example, the defendant may find it
advantageous to concede liability, so that the remaining
issue deals only with the amount of damages. 99 Similarly,
where there are plaintiffs from both the United States and
foreign countries, the defendant who wishes to have the
case dismissed may settle the claims of American plain-
94, Id. at 257.
,, Id. at 257-61.
.. 17 Av. CAS. (CCH) 18,613 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
,.7 Id. at 18,616-17.
9, See Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 632 F.2d 1027, 1031 (3d Cir. 1980);
Rubenstein v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 587 F. Supp. 460, 461 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Boskoff,
17 Av. CAS. at 18,613; Dasi v. Air India, 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) 17,308 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 503-04 (S.D.N.Y.),
aft'd, 633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980).
!Is, See, e.g., Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 15 Av. CAs. (CCH)
17,153 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(airline conceded liability and agreed to appear voluntarily
in foreign jurisdiction for assessment of damages).
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tiffs, since theforum non conveniens doctrine is applied more
readily when all of the plaintiffs are foreigners. I00
III. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Conventions
One of the main purposes of the Warsaw Convention' °
is to avoid conflicts of law regarding the liability of the
carrier vis-a-vis the passenger and his survivors. In order
to achieve this aim, the Convention unifies some of the
substantive provisions of law in this field, including cer-
tain limitations of the amounts of damages. 0 2 However,
the unification is not, and was never intended to be, to-
tal.'0 3 Moreover, some passengers are not covered by the
convention system at all, for example because their jour-
ney is purely domestic or is from or to a state that is not
bound by any of the versions of the Convention. 04 It has
been reported that one prominent American aircraft liti-
gation attorney, when travelling to Europe, regularly used
to buy a ticket with a non-Warsaw destination (in those
days, Turkey), in order to avoid the Warsaw limits should
an accident occur. We may assume that upon successful
landing at his real destination such as London or Paris he
simply turned in the remaining flight coupon indicating
Turkey as a last stop and obtained a refund. 0 5
Regarding some of the questions unregulated by the
Convention's substantive provisions, the Convention con-
tains a conflict rule, prescribing the application of lex
oo See Barrett, US Courts and forum non conveniens, 10 AIR LAw 58, 64-65 (1985).
It seems that a tactical settlement of this type took place in the case In re Disaster at
Riyadh Airport, 540 F. Supp. at 1144.
10, Warsaw Convention, supra note 15.
102 Id. at ch. III, arts. 20-22.
,- The title of the Warsaw Convention states that it is the Convention for Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air. Id. (em-
phasis added).
I- d. at ch. I, art. 1(2).
105 See R. ARNOLD, DIE PRODUKTHAFTUNG IN DER LuFr - UND RAUMFAHRT, DOKU-
MENTATION EINES INTERNATIONALEN KOLLOQUIUMS IN K6LN 282 (B6cksteigel ed.
1978).
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fori. 10 6 Article 21 of the original Warsaw text, which re-
mained unchanged by the Hague amendments, provides
that the court may, "in accordance with the provisions of
its own law," exonerate the carrier wholly or partly of his
liability if the carrier proves that the negligence of the in-
jured person caused or contributed to the damage.1 0 7 Ac-
cording to article 22(1), the law of the forum decides
whether damages may be awarded in the form of periodic
payments.1 0 8 Pursuant to article 29(2), the period of limi-
tation, which the countries of the European continent
deem a question of substantive law, shall be determined
by the law of the court seized of the case.' 0 9 Finally, arti-
cle 25(1) of the original Warsaw text stipulates that the
carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provi-
sions of the Convention limiting or excluding his liability
"if the damage was caused by his willful misconduct or by
such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of
the court seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent
to willful misconduct."' " 0
Nevertheless, there remain a number of important is-
sues that are neither regulated by the Convention's sub-
stantive rules nor covered by any of the Convention's
above mentioned references to lex fori. Of importance in
air crash cases, for example, are the questions of who is
entitled to claim damages in the case of a passenger's
death, what types of injuries and damages are compen-
sated (e.g. whether the emotional suffering is to be com-
pensated) and how damages are computed (e.g. how
much a lost finger is worth). While some believe that
these matters should generally be regulated by the sub-
stantive rules of lex fori," others maintain that the legal
- Warsaw Convention, supra note 15, at ch. III, art. 21.
107 Id.
,-. Id. at art. 22(1).
1-, Id. at art. 29(2).
11o Id. at art. 25(1).
I"I See, e.g., Lukoschek, Das anwendbare Deliksrecht bei Flugzeugunghicken, 27 VER6F-
FENTLICHUNGEN DES INSTITUTS FOR VERSICHERUNGSWISSENSCHAFF DER UNIVER-
SITAT MANNHEIM 16-17, 25-26 (1984).
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system designated by conflict rules of the forum country
should control.'1 12
Those who advocate lex fori assert that it leads to a
greater degree of uniformity of results since it avoids the
hazards of the various national conflict rules. A general
application of the forum's own substantive rules, how-
ever, would not achieve uniformity since the applicable
rules and the result would, in such a case, depend on the
country where the lawsuit is initiated. In fact, the oppo-
site approach, favoring the application of the private in-
ternational law of the forum, is preferable since it
supports the general principle that the law of the country
having the most relevant connection to the case should
apply. Although national conflict rules may vary, they are
generally based on this principle and would often be more
conducive to uniformity of results than would a mechani-
cal application of the substantive law of the forum
country.
Products liability, rather than the Convention, governs
the liability of the aircraft manufacturer. Important ef-
forts have been made to unify the substantive rules of the
Western European countries in this area. On January 27,
1977, the European Convention on Products Liability in Regard
to Personal Injury and Death (the "European Convention")
was concluded in Strasbourg under the auspices of the
Council of Europe."13 The European Convention con-
tains no conflict rules, but it contains a few elementary
substantive provisions on the liability of the manufac-
turer. 14 The Council Directive on the approximation of the
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member
States concerning liability for defective products, adopted by the
EEC Council on July 25, 1985, is of greater practical im-
112 See, e.g., W. GULDIMANN, INTERNATIONALES LUvFrRANSPORTRECHT 16, 144
(1965); Sadikov, Conflicts of Laws in International Transport Law, 190 RECUEIL DES
COURS 188, 242-243 (1985 I); C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, 1 AIR LAW 1(92)
(4th ed. 1986); P. URWANTSCHKY, FLUGZEUGUNFALLE MIT AUSLANDSBEROHRUNG
UND AUFLOCKERUNG DES DELIKTSSTATUTS 103 (1986).
11. Eur. T.S. No. 91. No country has ratified the European Convention.
114 Id.
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portance.1 5 This rather complex directive aims at the in-
clusion of almost identical substantive provisions in the
legal systems of the member states on producer's liability
for damage caused by a defect in his product." 6 Certain
enumerated circumstances release the manufacturer from
liability. The most important defense in air crash cases is
when the manfacturer proves that the state of scientific
and technical knowledge when he put the product into
circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the
defect to be discovered. 1 7
Since there is no universally followed convention pro-
viding uniform substantive rules on products liability,
conflict rules will continue to play an extremely important
role in this field. While the Hague Convention on the Law
Applicable to Product Liability, elaborated at the Twelfth Ses-
sion of the Hague Conference for Private International
Law in 1972,18 represents an attempt towards uniform
conflict rules, it has been ratified by very few countries
(France, Yugoslavia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and
Norway). This convention is based on the so-called
"grouping of contacts" and its effect in typical air crash
situations most often gives the plaintiff a choice between
the law of the place of the crash and the law of the defend-
ant manufacturer's principal place of business.
B. Conflict Rules on Tortious Liability in Western Europe
The rule of lex loci delicti (the law of the place of the
harm) plays a very important role in Western Europe,
although most of the statutory provisions, precedents and
legal writings do not relate specifically to air crash cases.
1- 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 210) 29 (1985) [hereinafter EEC Directive]; see
Die Produkthaftungs - Richtlinie der Europschen Gemeinschaft und der Luftverkehr, 36
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR LUFT-UND DER WELTRAUMRECHT 170-79 (1987).
-16 EEC Directive, supra note 115, at 29.
117 Id. at art. 7(e).
181 See Conference de La Haye de droit international priv6, October 21, 1972,
Actes et documents de la Douzi~me session, 246-250 for the text of the Conven-
tion. For a critical analysis of the Convention, see H. TEBBENS, INTERNATIONAL
PRODUCT LIABILITY, 333-360 (1979).
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In England, liability for torts committed in England is
governed exclusively by English law, even if both parties
come from the same foreign country.1 19 The state of law
regarding torts committed abroad is somewhat more com-
plicated. The traditional rule concerning such torts was
enunciated in 1870 in Phillips v. Eyre. 120 A tort committed
abroad generally entitles the victim to damages only to
the extent the case is actionable under both the rule of lex
loci delicti and English law.' 21 The meaning and rele-
vance of two other precedents in this field, Machado v.
Fontes 122 and Chaplin v. Boys, 123 is disputed. A peculiar fea-
ture of English air law is Article 3 of the Carriage by Air
Act (Application of Provisions) Order 1967,124 which ap-
plies English substantive law to all air carriage cases
outside the Warsaw Convention, regardless of whether
they have any connection with England. Thus, in Holmes v.
Bangladesh Biman Corp.,125 the court applied English law
concerning the maximum amount of the carrier's liability
in the case of a fatal accident on a purely domestic flight
in Bangladesh. The court held that the 1967 Order ap-
plied to all cases on non-international carriage before an
English court. 12 6
In German private international law, tortious liability is
basically governed by the lex loci delicti. 127 The recent
legislative reform of German private international law in
.... See Szalatnay-Stacho v. Fink, 1947 K.B. 1 (C.A. 1946).
12o 6 L.R.-QB. 1 (1870).
121 See G. CHESHIRE & P. NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 532 (11 th ed.
1987); J. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 314-15 (3d ed. 1984); Comment, The
Role of Choice of Law in Determining Damages for International Aviation Accidents, 51 J.
AIR L. & COM. 953, 981 (1986); C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, 1 AIR LAw 1(93)
(4th ed. 1987).
22 [1897] 2 Q.B. 231 (C.A.) (where an act is not authorized, innocent, or excus-
able where it is committed, an English court may apply English law).
3 1971 App. Cas. 356 (H.L. 1969) (court granted damages in accordance with
English law over Maltese law).
124 Carriage by Air Act, S.I. 1967, No. 480, art. 3; see 2 HALSBURY'S LAws OF
ENGLAND 808 n.1 (L. Hailsham 4th ed. 1973).
2 3 2 Lloyd's Rep. 192 (1987); see Kean, Non-international carriage: Holmes v. Ban-
gladesh Biman Corp., 12 AIR LAw 145 (1987) for a discussion of the case.
12(i 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 192.
127 See Judgment of March 8, 1983, Bundesgerichtshof, Senate, W. Ger., 87
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1986 has not affected this established rule. In those cases
where the tortious act has not been committed in the
country where the resulting injury has occurred, the Ger-
man conflict rule applies the law more favorable to the
victim or chosen by him (the so-called Gunstigkeit-
sprinzip).' 28 There are, however, two statutory exceptions
to the rule of lex loci delicti. Article 38 (corresponding to
article 12 before 1986) of the Introductory Act to the Ger-
man Civil Code shields a German wrongdoer from greater
liability for torts committed abroad than he would be sub-
ject to under German law. 129 A war-time decree of 1942,
which is still in force, provides that tortious claims be-
tween Germans shall be governed by German law even if
the tort has been committed abroad.130
There appear to be additional, judge-made, exceptions
contributing to the Auflockerung der Tatortregel, i.e. to the
loosening of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti. If the
victim and the wrongdoer are permanent residents of the
same country, the law of their country of residence shall
normally apply rather than the law of the place of the tort,
provided that neither of them is a citizen of the country
where the tort occurred' 3' or that there was some relevant
relationship between them before the injury. 3 2 This rela-
tionship can be permanent, created by operation of law
BGHZ 95, reprinted in 36 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1972 (1983); Lukos-
chek, supra note 111, at 29; P. URWANTSCHKY, supra note 112, at 6-7.
"-' See Judgment of November 12, 1932, Reichsgericht, Senate, W. Ger., 138
Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 243; Judgment of June 23, 1964, Bundesger-
ichtshof, Senate, W. Ger., reprinted in 17 NEUEJURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 2012
(1964); Sonnenberger, Mzinchener Kommentar zum Bugerlichen Gesetzbuch,
EINFUHRUNGSGESETZ ZUM BURGERLICKEN GESETZBUCIHE INTERNATIONALES PRIVA-
TRECHT 675-76 (1983).
9 EINFURHRUNGSGESETZ ZUM BRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHE [EGBGB] § 38 (W.
Ger.).
I'll Verordnung iber die Rechtsanwendung bei Schidigungen deutscher Staat-
sangehbriger ausserhalb des Reichsgebietes, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] I 706 (W..
Ger.)
1.1'Judgment of Oct. 5, 1976, Bundesgerichtshof, Senate, W. Ger., reprinted in
30 NEUE JURISTICHE WOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 496 (1977); Judgment of Jan. 8,
1985, Bundesgerichtshof, Senate, W. Ger., 93 BGHZ 214.
312 Judgment of Mar. 13, 1984, Bundesgerichtshof, Senate, W. Ger., 90 BHGZ
294, reprinted in 37 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2032 (1984).
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(such as marriage), or purely temporary and factual (e.g.
the parties travelled together as members of the same
group). 133
The Austrian Act on Private International Law of June
15, 1978,134 provides in section 48(1) that non-contractual
damage claims shall be judged according to the law of the
state in which the damage-causing conduct occurred.' 3 1
However, section 48(1) also provides that if the parties
"have a stronger connection to the law of one and the
same other state, that law shall be determinative."' 136
In France, as in many other countries, the traditional
conflict rule for torts is that of lex loci delicti. 37 The rule
is not embodied in any statute, but was developed by case
law, finally proclaimed in 1948 by the French Cour de Cas-
sation in the case of Lautour c. Veuve Guiraut, 138 and con-
firmed thereafter. 3 9 If the wrongful act and the resulting
injury have not occurred in the same country, French pri-
vate international law tends to prefer the law of the place
of injury.140
The leading Swedish conflict case in the field of torts is
Cronsioe v. Forsikringsaktieselskabet National, decided by the
Swedish Supreme Court in 1969.' a' The decision rests on
the traditional rule of lex loci delicti, making no exception
where the parties are domicilliaries and citizens of the
same foreign country.'42
Id.
1:.4 Bundesgesetz vom 15 Juni 1978 iber das internationale Privatrecht (IPR-
Gesetz), BUNDESGESEZTBLATr [BGBL] 304 (Aus.). An English translation of the
Act can be found in Palmer, The Austrian Codiftcation of Conflicts Law, 28 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 197, 222-34 (1980).
Palmer, supra note 134, at 234.
Id.
, See Y. LOUSSOUARN & P. BOUREL, supra note 58, at 235-36.
Judgment of May 25, 1948, Cass. Civ. Ire, Fr., 1948 Recueil Dalloz,Juripru-
dence [D.S. Jur.] 357, reprinted in 38 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PRIV9 [R.C.D.I.P.] 91 (1949).
1..9 See, e.g.,Judgment of May 30, 1967, Cass. Civ. Ire., Fr., 1967 Recueil Dalloz,
Sirey, Jurisprudence [D.S. Jur.] 629.
... See Y. LousSOUARN & P. BOUREL, supra note 58, at 508-10; cf Judgment of
Mar. 12, 1957, Fr., reprinted in 1957 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT AgRIEN 276.
31 NyrrJURIDISKT ARKIV 163 (1969).
1 Id.
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C. Conflict Rules on Tortious Liability in the United States
Each of the more than fifty states and territories within
the United States has its own set of conflict rules,
although there are important similarities that make it pos-
sible to discuss these sets of rules together as one "fam-
ily." While these rules have been developed mainly for
conflicts between the laws of the different states, they are
also used in international conflict situations. Although
there are no special conflict rules regarding air crashes,
the case law concerning aircraft accidents is so volumi-
nous that there are cases dealing with nearly every con-
flicts issue.
Almost all air crash disputes of consequence are adjudi-
cated by federal courts, which are usually considered bet-
ter qualified to deal with cases of this type. Most air crash
lawsuits in federal courts are cases involving diversity ju-
risdiction. 4 3 In diversity cases, the federal district courts
are obliged to follow the conflict rules of the particular
state where they sit. 14 4 If diversity lawsuits relating to the
same accident are initiated in different states but are even-
tually heard in one federal district court, that court must
follow the conflict rules of the state where each particular
action was originally filed.
The conflict rules of many states are unclear, which
means that the federal courts often get involved in guess-
work as to which law the courts of a particular state would
apply under the circumstances. Even if the substantive
rules of the applicable law are unclear, a federal court can
easily find itself in a situation similar to that of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the air
crash case of Nolan v. Transocian Air Lines, where the
court's principal task was "to determine what the New
York courts would think the California courts would think
, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982). Section 1332 states that "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy ex-
ceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between
-(1) citizens of different states; ... ." Id. § 1332(a).
,4 Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941).
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on an issue about which neither has thought." 145 On the
other hand, federal conflict rules may be applied by the
federal courts in those cases where their jurisdiction is
based not upon diversity of citizenship but upon federal
law such as admiralty146 or on the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act. 147
The traditional approach in practically all states to con-
flicts of law regarding torts was based on the application
of lex loci delicti. 48 In American conflict of laws, this
concept means the law of the place where the last event
necessary for the tortious liability occurred. 149 In reality
this usually means the application of the law of the place
where the injury occurred, since there can be no liability
without injury.
This approach, however, has received severe criticism
for being inflexible and for leading to fortuitous re-
sults. 150 Over the last few decades, the American conflict
rules have undergone radical changes in the field of torts.
The famous case of Babcock v. Jackson,' 5' being one of the
first steps in the direction away from the traditional ap-
proach of lex loci delicti, which is now followed in fewer
than twenty American jurisdictions, a group which gener-
ally does not include the more important states. 152 This
development has taken place with the support of many
American conflict writers who have contributed to the
discussion with a number of ingenious conflict theories
that are sometimes called "the American conflict
1- 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960), vacated per curium, 365 U.S. 293 (1961).
146 See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
147 See, e.g., Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1987).
141 See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 377 (1934); Sestito v. Knop, 297
F.2d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1961).
.... RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
I' Id. § 145 comment e. In practice, however, courts have often found it possi-
ble to arrive at the results they wanted without disassociating themselves openly
from the principle of lex loci delicti. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9
N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (court avoided application
of lex loci delicti by using public policy to characterize the measure of damages as
a procedural issue).
-, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
'5 See L. KREINDLER, 1 AVIATION ACCIDENT LAw § 2.03[1] (1987).
CONFLICT OF LA WS
revolution." 5 3
While this "revolution" is not limited to the area of
torts, torts are clearly the field which has been most influ-
enced by it.' 54 These new theories generally abandon the
concept of clear-cut and fixed conflict rules, which are dis-
paragingly described as "mechanical" and "blind."
Rather, they determine the applicable law by viewing the
circumstances of each particular case, including the sub-
stantive contents of the legal systems involved. At this
point, however, the unity stops and various authors and
courts have their own approaches, attributing different
weight to various circumstances. The common core of
most of the new theories is that each theory constitutes a
"maze" with unpredictable results and total lack of legal
security. That the American "conflicts revolution" has
made private international law untidy and disorderly has
been conceded by American authors, many of whom,
however, appear to like it that way.155 Analyzing some re-
cent American theories and judgments is like peeling an
onion: under each leaf there is another, with no real core
to be found. The conflict rules have been replaced by
vague "approaches" and "processes,"'156 and the conflict
of laws has "dissolved into a marshy delta with hundreds
of rivulets and canals and no clear central channel."'1
57
One of the main "modern" American approaches to the
problem of conflicts of law in the field of torts is that of
"governmental interest analysis", developed originally by
Professor Brainerd Currie.15 " As applied today, this the-
ory advocates that the law of the state having the strong-
est legitimate interest in advancing its policies in a
,.1- See Reese, American Choice of Law, 30 AM. J. CoMp. L. 135 (1982).
154 Id.
-. See Juenger, American and European Conflicts Law, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 117, 133
(1982); Lowenfeld, Renvoi Among the Law Professors: An American's View of the Euro-
pean View of American Conflict of Laws, 30 AM.J. CoMp. L. 99, 114-15 (1982).
1-- See Kegel, Paternal Home and Dream Home: Traditional Conflict of Laws and the
American Reformers, 27 AM.J. CoMP. L. 615, 617 (1979).
,", Lowenfeld, supra note 155, at 99.
,- See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, in SELECT EsSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188, 259-66 (1963).
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particular case should prevail.' 5 9 This means, inter alia,
that different legal systems may often be applied to the
same claim for damages, depending on the issue in dis-
pute. Such a situation may, for example, result in the ba-
sis of liability being subject to one law and the amount of
compensation being subject to another law. This result
may occur since it can be argued that the country where
the wrongful act was committed has a great interest in the
regulation of behavior in its territory (including issues
such as the definition of negligence, the imposition of
strict liability for certain acts, or the imposition of punitive
damages), whereas it is less interested in the amount of
compensatory damages if the parties are foreign. This lat-
ter issue may be more important to the state or the states
of the permanent residence of the parties.
An example of this approach is In re Paris Air Crash of
March 3, 1974, 60 the introductory example at the begin-
ning of this paper. This case concerned an American-
manufactured aircraft, owned and operated by a Turkish
airline, which crashed in France, killing a large number of
people from many different countries and states.16' The
United States District Court for the Central District of
California declared that California was interested in pro-
tecting resident defendants and "would not allow en-
hanced recovery to plaintiffs because of the fortuitous
place of the crash or residence of the litigants."'' 62 Cali-
fornia would not allow non-residents a greater recovery
than allowed its own resident plaintiffs. 163 The court felt
sure that countries or states where recovery would be less
than under California law "had no interest in limiting re-
covery of their resident plaintiffs as against a nonresident
"164
In addition, California, as "the state of residence of de-
See id. at 280-81.
"" 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
Id. at 735.
1'' Id. at 744.
163 Id.
'"' Id. at 745.
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signers and manufacturers," had a most significant inter-
est in applying its measure of damages to achieve
uniformity of decisions relating to a product distributed
throughout the world. 65 The court concluded that the
United States and the State of California clearly had gov-
ernmental interests in applying California law, which were
significantly greater than the interests of the other coun-
tries involved. 66 Strangely enough, this meant the appli-
cation of California law' 67 (lex fori) even as to the liability
of the Turkish air carrier!
The second modern approach is the theory of the
"most significant relationship," "center of gravity" or
"grouping of contacts," which the court relied upon in
Babcock '68 and which is supported by the Second Restate-
ment. 6 9 Regarding personal injuries and wrongful death,
the Second Restatement's sections 146 and 175 explain
that:
[T]he local law of the state where the injury occurred de-
termines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless,
with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a
more significant relationship under the principles stated in
§ 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the
local law of the other state will be applied. 70
In order to understand this provision, it is naturally neces-
sary to present section 6:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will fol-
low a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to
the choice of the applicable rule of law include
165 Id.
-,i Id. at 749.
"67 Id.
Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 473, 191 N.E.2d at 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 146, 175 (1971). The vari-
ous volumes of the Restatement are presentations, in a systematic manner, of
common law in different fields of law in the United States. The Restatement en-
joys great persuasive authority, but is, nevertheless, a private compilation,
adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute, a private association.
170 Id. § 146.
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(a) the needs of the interstate and international
systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and
the relative interests of those states in the determination
of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law
to be applied.' 7'
The comment in the Second Restatement points out
that the list of factors in section 6(2) is not exhaustive,
that the factors mentioned are not listed in the order of
their relative importance and that at least some of the
mentioned factors will normally point in different direc-
tions.' 72 Consequently, the method provides only partial
guidance to the correct approach to choice of law and fur-
nishes no precise answers. The courts in each case are
expected to look to the underlying factors themselves in
order to arrive at a decision that will best accommodate
them. 73
Since the site of an air crash is generally fortuitous, the
references in sections 146 and 175 to the law of the state
of the injury will often have to yield to the factors listed in
section 6(2).' Thus, in Proprietors Insurance Co. v. Val-
secchi, 17 4 the court applied Florida law as a result of the
"most significant relationship" test to the question of lia-
bility and damages arising out of an air crash in North
Carolina, ,since the decedents were residents of Florida,
the plane had been rented in Florida from the defendants
who were Florida residents, and the flight had begun and
was to end in Florida. 75 Federal courts in admiralty cases
171 Id. § 6.
172 Id. § 6 comment c.
173 Id.
,74 435 So. 2d 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
17- Id. at 293-97.
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apply an approach based on significant contacts or signifi-
cant relationships in maritime air crash cases.' 76
The two modem theories described are the principal
ones and the only ones that courts in air crash cases use
on a large scale. There are a number of other theories
suggested by leading American scholars, such as the
"principles of preference" formulated by David Cavers. 17 7
An interesting approach is the theory of "choice-influenc-
ing considerations," advocated primarily by Robert Le-
flar 17 a and followed in at least some court decisions.' 79
Under this approach, the court should take into account
the following five factors:
(a) the predictability of results,
(b) the maintenance of interstate and international order,
(c) the simplification of the judicial task,
(d) the advancement of the forum's governmental inter-
ests, and
(e) the application of the better rule of law.i8 0
Factors (c), (d) and (e) obviously favor the application of
lex fori, and an analysis of the cases decided on the basis
of Leflar's methodology demonstrates that a large major-
ity of cases have been decided solely on the basis of con-
siderations (d) and (e).' 8 ' Professor Leflar's last-
mentioned factor, i.e. the application of the better law, is
considered by another American professor, Friedreich K.
Juenger, to be the only relevant one. Juenger's principal
idea is that the court should apply the legal system which
leads to the best substantive result in the particular
case.18 2 There can be no doubt that many courts, without
'17; See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay, India onJan. 1, 1978, 531 F.
Supp. 1175 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
177 See generally D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS (1965).
"" R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw §§ 105-11 (2d ed. 1968).
17t, See In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass., on July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp.
1106, 1113 (D. Mass. 1975) (concerning New Hampshire's conflict rules).
... R. LEFLAR, supra note 178, §§ 105-11.
"' See Hanotiau, The American Conflicts Revolution and European Tort Choice-of-Law
Thinking, 30 AM.J. COMP. L. 73, 82 (1982).
'- See generally F. JUENCER, ZUM WANDEL DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS
(1974).
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admitting it openly, follow this approach.
In utilizing the new theories, American courts often in-
discriminately combine the various methods and ap-
proaches even when applying the conflict rules of the
same state.1 8 3 The courts frequently pay lip service to one
method, when in fact they use another.'i 4 It seems that
the courts-too often refer to the formulas of the govern-
mental interest approach or of the Second Restatement,
without making any actual analysis of the real effects of
the formula on the particular case. The judiciary has em-
phasized that the various approaches are basically the
same, that they are consistent with each other and they
will likely produce about the same result on a given set of
facts.' 8 5 Most of the modern theories normally seem to
lead to the same result, namely the application of lex
fori.18 6 Indeed, many cases can be interpreted simply to
mean that the courts will give plaintiffs the benefit of lex
fori when it is more favorable than the foreign lex loci
delicti, provided that there is a fair basis for doing so.187
Some courts apply lex fori without bothering to support it
by any particular theory.'88
Paradoxically, the Court of Appeals of New York, the
very court that marked the beginning of the new era in
18.1 See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 67, at 551.
1"4 See Hanotiau, supra note 181, at 84.
- See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d
594, 610 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981). A federal district court, in a
diversity case, concluded that each test used the same analytical inquiry, reflecting
the underlying consistency between the tests and producing approximately the
same results. The court quoted Professor Leflar:
[I]t appears that the various scholarly views concerning choice of
law, developed during the last couple of decades, are being accepted
by the courts as though they constituted one somewhat multi-faceted
approach to the subject. Essentially, they are consistent with each
other. Any one of them is likely to produce about the same results
on a given set of facts as will another ....
Id.
. See, e.g., id. at 613-16.
See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 205 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978); see also Lowenfeld, supra note 155, at 102 n.67.
- See, e.g., Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 413 Mich. 406, 320 N.W.2d 843
(1982) (adopting no exact methodology but applying lex fori).
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Babcock, now seems to miss the old rule of lex loci delicti.
In Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc. ,189 decided in 1978, the
court of appeals confirmed that "lex loci delicti remains
the general rule in tort cases to be displaced only in ex-
traordinary circumstances," although it added that "it has
been acknowledged that in airplane crash cases, the place
of the wrong, if it can be ascertained, is most often
fortuitous."'' 90
There are signs of increasing disenchantment with the
new theories, even among American legal scholars.
There is much truth in the disparaging remarks made
about the new approaches by one of their critics, Profes-
sor Ehrenzweig, who spoke about "the Second Restate-
ment's nonrule" and called the modern formulas "the
Desperanto of conflicts law."'' Professor Willis L. M.
Reese, the very reporter of the Second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, has, in an article published in 1982, pro-
posed certain conflict rules for aircraft accident cases
which look as if the American "conflict revolution" never
happened.92 In fact, Reese introduces his proposal with
the following statement:
First, the suggested formulations should consist of actual
rules of choice of law which would afford some predict-
ability of result and would be relatively easy for the courts
to apply. If possible, it would be desirable to avoid such
vague criteria as application of the law of the state with the
most significant relationship or of the state which has the
greatest interest in the decision of the issue at hand or of
the state whose interests would be most impaired if its law
were not applied. Formulations of this sort are hard for
the courts to apply and afford little predictability except in
44 N.Y.2d 698, 376 N.E.2d 914, 405 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1978).
Id. at 699, 376 N.E.2d at 915, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 442.; cf. O'Rourke v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984) (lex loci delicti will not be applied
when lexi fori will provide substantially the same remedy).
.. See Ehrenzweig, Specific Principles of Private International Law, 124 RECUEIL DES
COURS 254, 325 (1968 II).
111 Reese, The Law Governing Airplane Accidents, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1303
(1982).
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the clearest of cases.' 93
The main weakness of most of the modern American
theories is that they permit the court to arrive at virtually
any solution it happens to prefer in the particular case;
they make every result possible without actually leading to
any of them. 94 Furthermore, it appears that the reported
judgments do not give the real reasons behind the partic-
ular decisions. The judges loyally invoke the formulas of
''most significant relationship,' ''governmental interest
analysis" and the like but use them as mere cover-up for
their real reasons, such as their concern for the passenger
or his survivors, which have resulted in the application of
a particular legal system.195
It has been hinted that European lawyers, more than
their American colleagues, like rules, if only to be able to
deviate from them. 196 The popularity of the "non-rule ap-
proach" in the United States may, indeed, have something
to do with recruitment and status of American judges,
who are normally appointed from the ranks of practicing
attorneys with substantial experience. Such judges can
perhaps be expected to possess an amount of "judicial in-
tuition" that will lead them to reasonable conclusions
even when the rule in a particular case is that there is not
and should not be any fixed rule. In countries of the con-
tinental Europe, the judges, at least in trial courts, are
very often young lawyers in their late twenties who have
joined the judiciary directly after graduation and who
need more guidance than do their American colleagues.
Even in the United States, however, the modern theo-
ries cause difficulties since they lead to a total lack of fore-
seeability and legal security. Much of the excessive
American litigation in this field is probably due to this lack
of predictability, which makes it difficult for the lawyers to
advise their clients and to negotiate a settlement. While
'. Id. at 1304 (citations omitted).
,4 See Hanotiau, supra note 181, at 84.
See Reese, supra note 192, at 1304-05.
See H. TEBBENS, supra note 118, at 193.
CONFLICT OF LA WS
some maintain that the application of the new American
conflict theories by the courts will through normal opera-
tion of stare decisis in time result in the development of a
system of more detailed choice-of-law norms, 97 the fun-
damental philosophy of the new theories militates against
the existence of any precise conflict rules at all.
D. Contractual Liability of the Carrier
The passenger does not usually have a contractual rela-
tionship with the manufacturer or repairer of the aircraft,
the supplier of fuel, the operator of the air control and
other similar defendants. According to some legal sys-
tems, however, these defendants can be liable for breach
of an implied warranty vis-a-vis the passenger, despite the
lack of privity of contract.'9 " Liability for implied war-
ranty, in contrast to liability for express warranty, is nor-
mally subject to the conflict rules pertaining to torts.
Indeed, liability for breach of implied warranty does not
arise because of the intentions of the parties when they
enter into the contract, but because the law imposes it in
the furtherance of social policies similar to those fur-
thered by the law of torts. In fact, strict liability in tort
and liability under implied warranty without privity of
contract might be merely two different ways of describing
the very same cause of action.' 99 The same can be said of
197 See, e.g., E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 67, at 606.
's See, e.g., Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)
(holding that under applicable California law privity was not essential for recovery
from the defendant aircraft manufacturer on the ground of breach of implied
warranty).
'! : See, e.g., Feldman, Actions in Contract Resulting from Aircraft Crashes, 12 CLEV.-
MARSHALL L. REV. 472, 479 (1963); Kinzy, Current Aviation Decisions in Conflict of
Laws, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 311, 319 (1975); H. TEBBENS, supra note 118, at 227-28.
In the case of Uppgren v. Executive Aviaiton Servs., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 709 (D.
Md. 1971), the court interpreted the choice-of-law rules of Maryland in the follow-
ing way:
It is believed by this court that the highest court of Maryland, if
faced with the necessity to decide the question, would determine
that an action based upon an implied warranty ... bears such a close
relationship to one based upon tort that it should be subject to the
rule of /ex loci delicti for the same reasons as is a tort action.
Id. at 716.
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some European judge-made counterparts of implied war-
ranty, such as the French doctrine of action directe and the
Austrian theory of "contractual duty to protect a third
party. 20 0
The legal relationship between the carrier and the pas-
senger, on the other hand, is essentially a contractual one,
based on a contract for carriage by air. An air crash, kill-
ing or injuring a passenger, practically always is a viola-
tion of the carrier's contractual obligation to provide safe
carriage. Death of or injury to a person is, at the same
time, in most legal systems the classic example of a tort
(unerlaubte Handlung, di lit)). Since the contractual and tor-
tious liabilities are traditionally treated differently in the
conflict of laws,20 ' one may ask whether the carrier's liabil-
ity for killing or injuring a passenger should be classified
as contractual or tortious for the purposes of private in-
ternational law. It is more proper, however, to avoid this
question in air crash cases by applying the same conflict
rule to both the contractual and tortious aspects of the
carrier's liability. This does not necessarily mean that lia-
bility in tort should be governed by the proper law of the
contract (the so-called akzessorische Ankntuupfung) or that
contractual liability should be governed by the law appli-
cable to tort. In air crash cases, it appears preferable to
follow a special conflict rule, different from those com-
monly used in the field of contracts and torts.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The initial question to be answered is whether the
courts should follow some fixed conflict rules or be free to
choose the applicable law as they please, using one or an-
other more-or-less sophisticated method of concealing
2'H See Posch, Issues in International Products Liability Cases, LEGAL ASPECTS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS II 61, 67-69 (D. Campbell & C. Rohwer ed.
1985).
211 The modern American conflict theories will, however, normally lead to the
application of the same legal system regardless of whether the disputed liability is
in tort or in contract.
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this freedom behind various theories. While a more fixed
set of rules is preferable, the general application of the
over-simplified traditional rule of lex loci delicti is inap-
propriate. The principal advantages of the traditional
rule, namely the ease of determining the applicable law
with the resulting predictability of outcome, are not pres-
ent in many air crash cases. In any case, they carry less
weight than the rule's fundamental disadvantages arising
from the fortuitous nature of the site of the crash. The
modern American approaches are, on the other hand,
hardly suitable for world-wide use, due to their inter-pro-
vincial background and their almost totally unpredictable
results.
As to the liability of the carrier, some advocate that the
law of the place of the passenger's permanent residence
should govern. The American lawyer Allan I. Mendel-
sohn has even proposed that a special conflict rule to this
effect should be introduced into the Warsaw Conven-
tion.20 2 The generosity of the laws of many states within
the United States would render such a rule, in most cases,
advantageous to passengers or survivors of passengers
who permanently reside in the United States. Mr. Men-
delsohn points out that the place of the passenger's domi-
cile or permanent residence is usually also the place of
purchase of the ticket and also the place of the journey's
destination or starting point.20 3 The law of this place is
the law most familiar to the passenger and most suited to
the economic conditions to which he was accustomed. It
is, furthermore, the law under which the passenger's es-
tate will be probated and under which his survivors most
likely live.2 4 A generally accepted application of the law
of the passenger's domicile would put an end to, or at
least limit, the advantages of forum shopping.20 5
'-112 See Mendelsohn, A Conflict of Laws Approach to the Warsaw Convention, 33J. AIR
L. & CoM. 624, 628-31 (1967).
Id. at 628.
204 Id.
2115 Id. at 630.
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The main disadvantage, however, of Mendelsohn's pro-
posal is its unequal treatment of passengers from different
countries who suffered similar injuries as a result of the
same accident.2 0 6 Damages are ultimately paid by the
whole travelling public in the form of higher air fares.
Therefore, unless the American passengers are made to
pay more for their tickets than passengers residing in
countries with less generous laws on damages, the high
damages paid to Americans would actually be subsidized
by travellers from other, often poorer, countries. In some
extreme cases, one could even imagine that the carriers
would be tempted to discriminate between passengers in
order to protect the life and health of passengers from
particularly "expensive" countries such as the United
States. Last but not least, this approach could easily force
a single court to apply the rules of dozens of legal systems
in a single air crash case.
An interesting, but rather complicated, proposal has
been submitted by another American, Professor Willis
L.M. Reese. 20 7 His basic guidelines are, inter alia, the equal
treatment of all passengers and an opportunity for plain-
tiffs to choose, from a limited number of alternatives, the
legal system most beneficial to their claims. This freedom
of choice would free the court, at least in large part, from
the task of determining the legal system to be applied and
should not lead to any serious disparity of treatment
among passengers on the same plane since one of the
available alternatives should in almost every case prove to
the most favorable law to all passengers. Reese suggests
that a plaintiff (the passenger or his survivors) suing a car-
rier should be allowed to choose among the law of any of
the following: (1) the place of the carrier's principal place
of business (2) the place where the carrier's act or omis-
sion causing the accident was committed, such as the
place of error in navigation or the place where the carrier
maintained, inspected or repaired the airplane (3) the
21; Cf id. at 631.
217 Reese, supra note 192, at 1303-23.
CONFLICT OF LA WS
place of departure or (4) the place of intended
destination. °8
Punitive damages, however, could be governed by the
first or second alternative only, since a defendant should
only be held liable for punitive damages under the law of
a state that has a substantial interest in regulating his ac-
tivities and in deterring him from engaging in improper
conduct. The third and fourth alternatives create
problems if the flight has several scheduled stops and dif-
ferent passengers have boarded the plane and/or in-
tended to disembark in different countries. In order not
to sacrifice the principle of equal treatment of all passen-
gers, Reese suggests that each passenger be allowed to
choose the law of any scheduled stop even though it was
neither his stop of departure nor his intended place of
destination. °9
While victims of the same air crash should rightfully
have their claims adjudicated according to the same legal
rules, total equality in this respect is often impossible to
achieve, since, for example, two passengers on the same
flight may very well be subject to different versions of the
Warsaw Convention. This, however, is not an acceptable
excuse for failing to attain equality of treatment whenever
possible. The same legal system should thus normally ap-
ply regardless of the domicile of the passenger or his sur-
vivors and regardless of such factors as the place of the
purchase of the ticket, the place of the boarding or the
place of the intended disembarking of the individual pas-
senger. Reese's proposal permitting the plaintiff to
choose among the laws of all conceivable places of em-
barking or disembarking seems to me to be unrealistic
and even inappropriate, since it can lead to the applica-
tion of a legal system totally unrelated to the parties and
the occurrence. Such an extensive right of choice would,
furthermore, be excessively favorable to the plaintiffs. 10
211" Id. at 1313-16.
21111 Id. at 1315.
211 It is hardly surprising that the application of the law imposing the highest
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If the requirement of uniform treatment is accepted,
there remain in fact only two legal systems that can rea-
sonably govern the liability of the carrier. These are the
law of the carrier's principal place of business or that of
the place of the registration of the aircraft. Both are usu-
ally, although not always, identical. The application of the
law of the country of the aircraft's registration appears to
be the most appropriate principal rule.2 1' Whereas the
principal place of business of the carrier may sometimes
be open to doubt, especially if it is not the statutory but
the factual seat that is intended, the registration of the air-
craft is unambiguous. The application of the law of the
country where the crashed aircraft was registered subjects
all passengers on the same flight to the same law and
makes this law easy to establish and foresee for all parties
involved, including the insurers of the carrier. If the
plaintiff proves, however, that the factual principal place
of business of the carrier was located in a country differ-
ent from that of the registration of the aircraft involved,
then the plaintiff should have the right to choose the law
of the carrier's principal place of business instead of that
of the country of the aircraft's registration. This alterna-
tive should avoid the risk of "flags of convenience," i.e.
the registration of aircraft in countries with rules particu-
larly favorable to carriers.
The liability of the aircraft manufacturer to the passenger
or his survivor is basically non-contractual. The applica-
tion of the traditional tort conflict rule of lex loci delicti
would normally lead to the application of either the law of
the place where the allegedly tortious act occurred (nor-
mally the law of the place where the aircraft had been
manufactured) or the law of the place of injury (the place
of the disaster). Reese's proposal for manufacturer's lia-
standard of care, stipulating the highest damages, is favored by air litigation law-
yers. See, e.g., L. KREINDLER, supra note 152, § 2.07.
211 See, e.g., Lukoschek, supra note 111, at 98; E. von Caemmerer, VORSCHLAGE
UND GUTACHTEN ZUR REFORM DES DEUTSCHEN INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS DER
AUSSENVERTRAGLICHEN SCHULDVERHALTNISSE, 446-47 (1983).
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bility is very similar to his suggestions regarding the liabil-
ity of the carrier. The main differences are that the law of
the carrier's principal place of business is replaced with
the law of the principal place of business of the producer
and that the law of the place of manufacture or design
replaces the law of the place of the navigational error or
of the place where the carrier maintained, inspected or re-
paired the airplane.21 2
It would be more appropriate, however, to give the in-
jured party the right to choose between the law of the
place where the tortious act had been committed (for ex-
ample, the place of defective manufacture) and the law of
the place of the aircraft's registration. Even in this situa-
tion, all passengers should thus be treated alike, regard-
less of their domicile, place of departure and other
individual connecting factors. The option of applying the
law of the place of manufacture is advantageous to the
plaintiffs, since the industrialized countries where most
aircraft are produced usually have rules on product liabil-
ity that are relatively favorable to the injured party. Un-
like the manufacturer's statutory seat or administrative
headquarters, the manufacturing facilities are difficult to
move abroad in order to avoid stringent product liability
rules. The plaintiff's right to choose the law of the coun-
try of the aircraft's registration is not unfair to the manu-
facturer, since any manufacturer of commercial aircraft
must in these days reasonably anticipate the possibility
that his products may be used by carriers all over the
world.
V. SUMMARY
The liability of the air carrier vis-a-vis the passenger or
his survivors in the event of an air crash should be deter-
mined by the law of the aircraft's registration ("flag"). If
the plaintiff shows that the defendant carrier's real princi-
pal place of business is in a country different from that of
2.2 Reese, supra note 192, at 1310.
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the aircraft's registration, he should be entitled to choose
the law of the carrier's principal place of business. The
liability of the manufacturer of an aircraft (or of a part of
an aircraft) should be governed by the law of the place of
his act or omission causing the accident (normally the
place of production) or by the law of the registration of
the aircraft carrying the injured or killed passenger, at the
option of the plaintiff. Similarly, the tortious liability of
others (the air control, the instructors who have taught
the crew, etc.) should be governed by the law of the place
where they have or should have acted or by the law of the
aircraft's registration, at the option of the plaintiff.
